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21 INTRODUCTION
The problem with which we are concerned relates to the following typical situation:
when modeling data, we attempt to use a formula to simplify the underlying process
that has been operating to produce the data. For it to be useful, the formula or model
should not only help us to better understand the underlying structure of the variables in
the specific past but also be predictive in a non-specific situation in the future. Ideally, it
should perform well under multiple scenarios. In general, the variables may be interde-
pendent. Some variables may even explain another one; thus, the explained one is highly
superfluous. Others may be entirely irrelevant to the underlying process. Selection of
the right variables or features in modeling and forecasting the underlying process is one
of the most fundamental problems in statistics, econometrics, and machine learning.
The results in this paper arise from two considerations. We first separate any
marginal effect into either a marginal gain or a marginal loss. For a motivating ex-
ample, let us consider the marginal effect of a bachelor’s degree (abbreviated “BD”) to
the annual income of an individual aged 40. The individual may have a BD or not. For
an individual with a BD, the marginal gain is computed as the difference between his
current annual income and his estimated annual income, assuming he had no BD, ceteris
paribus. For an individual with no BD, on the other hand, the marginal loss is computed
as the difference between his estimated annual income, assuming he had a BD, and his
current annual income, ceteris paribus. We note that the possession of a BD interweaves
with other factors, such as his profession and length of relevant work experience, which
also affect his income. We measure the value of a BD by the expected marginal gain and
marginal loss, incorporating the ownership uncertainty and the interdependence with
other factors. Our second consideration is the implicitly embedded bias when we admit
a candidate variable to the model or remove it from the model. In the above example,
3a BD holder may show some endowment bias, valuing the BD more than those who do
not have a BD. We define the bias as the expected difference between the marginal gain
and the marginal loss. We then propose solutions to mitigate the bias.
The approach we employ in this paper is Bayesian and game-theoretic. For a given
performance or objective function, our goal is to find a small set of variables that have
high importance concerning the performance criterion. We first use the performance
function as the payoffs on all subsets of candidate variables to set up a coalitional game.
In the game, we evaluate each player. Secondly, unlike many algorithm-based approaches
which search for a subset of variables with optimal collective performance, we incorporate
rather than ignore model uncertainty. The search for a single model, however, ignores
the model uncertainty (e.g., Clyde and George, 2004). Thus, we directly evaluate the
overall performance of each variable in a large set of modeling scenarios. Then, we
use their performance to select variables and institute the model. In the process, some
prior beliefs or distributions are required to specify the possibility of modeling scenarios.
In this sense, our approach is also Bayesian and uses model averaging (e.g., George
and McCulloch, 1997; O’Hara and Sillanpaa, 2009). Given some special classes of non-
informative priors, we show that the expected overall performance coincides with the
Shapley value (1953) and the Banzhaf value (1965) in the coalitional game.
The advantage of our approach is threefold. First, by dichotomizing the marginal
effect and acknowledging the model uncertainty, we generalize the Shapley value and the
Banzhaf value under the same framework. They differ in prior distributions which quan-
tify the likelihood of modeling scenarios, but their prior distributions are not unique.
Next, also from the dichotomization, we introduce a concept of bias and discover the
symmetry in the Banzhaf value and asymmetry in the Shapley value. We suggest a
simple way to adjust the asymmetry. Simulations show that our bias-adjusted solu-
tions perform exceptionally well, compared with a few variable selection methods used
4in practice, such as stepwise regression, information-based subset search, and LASSO
(e.g., Tibshirani, 1996). Lastly, we introduce a new value solution based on binomial
distributions which embraces the Banzhaf value and which links the Shapley value by
compounding. It is as tractable in expression and calculation as the Shapley value and
the Banzhaf value; it allows the expected model size from the probability distribution
to be consistent with the actual model.
Our research here aims at applying the concepts of cooperative game theory and,
in particular, developing the Shapley value in a data modeling and forecasting context.
Recently, the use of the Shapley value and cooperative game in modeling data has gained
popularity (e.g., Lipovetsky and Conklin, 2001; Cohen et al., 2007; Israeli, 2007; Gromp-
ing, 2007; Devicienti, 2010; Strumbelj and Kononenko, 2010 & 2014; Raja et al., 2016),
partly due to its simplicity and generality. Moreover, the value allows heterogeneous or
nonlinear marginal contributions in different coalitional situations. The vast literature
also provides us with many variations on the Shapley value (e.g., Donderer and Samet,
2002; Winter, 2002). Our research here offers not only a new proof and a new interpre-
tation of the Shapley value but also a theoretical foundation for appropriately using the
value concept in variable selection and related fields. Theorem 1 in this paper was pre-
viously proved in Hu (2002); the first two theorems of this paper are a generalization of
the results in Hu (2006), in which unanimous support of the bill to vote is not necessary,
and the payoff function is binary. A closely related work in Hu (2018) applies a similar
valuation approach to fairly allocate unemployment welfare.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 formulates the essential
ideas of dichotomized marginal effect and relate them to the Shapley value and the
Banzhaf value. Next, Section 3 analyzes the difference, called endowment bias, between
the expectations of marginal gain and marginal loss. In this section, a weighted unbiased
solution is proposed. After that, Section 4 discusses how to implement basic ideas with
5a sequential algorithm. In Section 5, we compare the simulation performance of our four
new solutions with seven other variable selection methods. In Section 6, we relate this
framework to several other topics in economics, political science, and statistics; we also
suggest a few directions to extend the framework. Our exposition is self-contained, and
the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 EVALUATION OF CANDIDATE PREDICTORS
Before our formal discussions, we introduce a few notations. Let N = {1,2, · · · ,n}
denote the set of all candidate variables, indexed as 1,2, ...,n. For any T ⊆N, let v(T )∈R
be a performance measure or performance function when we model the data using the
variables in T . In particular, for the empty set ∅, v(∅) is the performance when the
model does not involve any variables from N. We use “\” for set subtraction and “∪” for
set union. The vinculum (overbar) is used in naming the elements of a set; for example,
“i” for the singleton set {i} and “ij” for the set {i, j}. For any subset T ⊆ N, let |T |
denote its cardinality.
For a simple and concrete example, we may think of a dependent variable Y and
n candidate explanatory variables Xi, i = 1,2, ...,n, in a linear regression model. Thus,
the performance measure could be a model fit statistic, the variance explained, the
forecast accuracy, the cost involved, the probability of avoiding fatal errors, or any
combination of the above. In particular, v(∅) is the performance when Y is modeled by
a constant. Without loss of generality, we could even extend v to be a vector-valued set
function, which does not weaken any results in the next three sections. As a consequence,
variable selection eventually becomes a multi-criteria decision analysis, mitigating the
discrepancy between model accuracy in estimation and model usefulness in forecasting.
62.1 Model Uncertainty
Model uncertainty arises from both objective uncertainty and subjective one. For
the objective one, the models and assumptions we impose on the data are inevitably
misspecified in some way. As a consequence, an econometric or statistical model is
merely an approximation and simplification of the reality; and there could be many
good approximations under various criteria. For the subjective uncertainty, we do not
know exactly which specific variables to choose before performing a selection analysis; we
may have a class of subjective probabilities for it, derived from our judgment, opinions,
experience, or even fairness assumptions. However, we could still form valid inference
by addressing each modeling scenario separately.
To address the model uncertainty, we let the random subset S ⊆ N be the set of
variables in the true model. We also let µ be the probability distribution of S and PT
be the probability of S = T . Without any specific prior knowledge, we have no reason
to believe that one set of candidate variables is more likely to be S than another set of
the same size. That is, we should not discriminate between sets of variables having the
same size. Given the size of S, in other words, we have no reason to select one variable
and reject another; the consequence is that each variable is equally likely to be selected.
This equality of opportunity or rule of epistemic probabilities can be formally justified
by Leibniz’s principle of insufficient reason or Keynes’s principle of indifference.
Let us define a class of distributions with an equal opportunity:
F
def== { µ|PT is a function depending only on the size of T }.
In the above, we use the notation “ def==” for definition. For any t = 0,1, · · · ,n, let δt def=∑
T⊆N:|T |=t
PT , the probability of |S|= t. For any µ∈F , we can easily find the probability
density PT =
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
n! δ|T | , as there are
n!
(|T |)!(n−|T |)! subsets of size |T |. Thus, when
7µ ∈F , the set of {δt}nt=0 determines a specific prior µ. However, unlike other Bayesian
methods, we do not specify a specific prior distribution. Instead, we merely set up a
prior rule which corresponds to a particular class of prior distributions for µ. In Bayesian
probability, this is a set of non-informative priors.
Let us introduce three special subclasses of F indexed by η,
µ[η;SV] : PT =
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
(n+1)! + (−1)|T |η, ∀ T ⊆ N,
µ[η;BV] : PT = 12n + (−1)|T |η, ∀ T ⊆ N,
µ[η;BN] : PT = η|T |(1−η)n−|T |, ∀ T ⊆ N.
For any subclass, η is chosen such that all PT ’s are nonnegative. In addition, it is
not hard to verify that PT ’s over all T ⊆ N sum to 1 in the subclass. Thus, µ[η;SV],
µ[η;BV], or µ[η;BN] is a probability distribution, respectively. Here, SV, BV, and BN
are shorthands for “Shapley value”,“Banzhaf value” and “Binomial”, respectively. For
the prior µ[η;SV], δt = 1n+1 + (−1)tη
 n
t
 for all t = 0,1, · · · ,n. Thus, the model size
|S| has an expected value n2 . The distribution µ[η;BV] is a variant of µ[12 ;BN] with δt =[ 1
2n + (−1)tη
] n
t
 . Its model S also has an expected size n2 . For the prior µ[η;BN],
on the other hand, the model size |S| has a binomial distribution with parameters (n,η).
For its own sake, it extends µ[0;BV].
2.2 Dichotomous Valuation
The dichotomization of marginal effect in a coalitional game was introduced in Hu
(2002, 2006) to provide a new interpretation of the Shapley value and the Shapley-
Shubik power index (e.g., Shapley and Shubik, 1954). In the power index setting, a
voter may have two pivotal situations: either turning a losing vote to winning or vice
8versa. The two pivotal situations occur in certain random bipartition of the voters and
the probability of such random bipartition measures the power of the voter. In the
current setting, however, the performance function v takes values not merely 0 and 1.
Let us analyze the two-sided marginal effect of any candidate variable. For the
indeterminate model S, we could add one variable from N\S to the model, or we could
remove an existing variable from the model S. The variable’s marginal effect to v(S)
explains the worth of the addition or removal. There are two jointly exhaustive and
mutually exclusive scenarios:
• Scenario 1: i ∈ S. Then, i’s marginal effect is v(S)−v(S\ i), called marginal
gain, in that it contributes v(S)− v(S \ i) due to its existence in the model
S. The expected marginal gain is
γi[v;µ]
def== E
[
v(S)−v(S\ i)] . (1)
The notation “E(·)” here is for expectation under the probability measure µ.
• Scenario 2: i 6∈ S. Then, the marginal effect is v(S∪ i)−v(S) in that S faces
a marginal loss or opportunity cost v(S∪ i)− v(S) without variable i in the
model S. In other words, the ith variable could have increased the collective
performance by v(S∪i)−v(S) if we had added it to S. The expected marginal
loss, due to i’s absence from S, is
λi[v;µ]
def== E
[
v(S∪ i)−v(S)] . (2)
In either case, the marginal effect of i to v(S) can be written as v(S∪ i)−v(S\ i). Com-
bining these two exclusive marginals, we define variable i’s dichotomous value ψi[v;µ]
(hereinafter, “D-value”), as a functional function of v, by its expected marginal effect
9under the probability distribution µ:
ψi[v;µ]
def== γi[v;µ] +λi[v;µ] = E
[
v(S∪ i)−v(S\ i)] . (3)
In other words, the D-value ψi[v;µ] quantifies variable i’s overall performance in v under
the distribution µ, which itself specifies the likelihood of modeling scenarios for S. As
a function of functions, the functional ψ[v;µ] (γ[v;µ] or λ[v;µ]) takes the function v
as its input argument. The parameter µ, in essence, provides a weighting scheme for
the evaluation rule ψ (γ or λ, respectively). Formally, one could derive (3) from the
following two axioms:
• Marginality: given PT = 1, ψi[v;µ] = v(T ∪ i)−v(T \ i);
• Linearity: given any probability distributions µ1 and µ2 on 2N,
ψ[v;cµ1 + (1− c)µ2] = cψ[v;µ1] + (1− c)ψ[v;µ2]
for any 0≤ c≤ 1.
Two features distinguish the definition of D-value from that of probabilistic value
(e.g., Weber, 1988) or semivalue (e.g., Dubey et al., 1981). First, the D-value separates
the marginal gain and the marginal loss so that a bias can be formulated in the next
section. Secondly, the probability distribution µ is placed on the subsets of N, not on
the subsets of N \ i. Nevertheless, the D-value could be written as a semivalue or a
probabilistic value for some special µ.
In the proofs in the Appendix, we often capitalize on the relation that i’s marginal
gain in T equals its marginal loss in T \ i for any i ∈ T ⊆ N. Similarly, j’s marginal loss
in T equals its marginal gain in T ∪ j for any j 6∈ T ⊆ N. In addition, a dummy player,
who has zero marginal gain in all T ⊆N, has zero D-value. This dummy player property
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holds valid no matter what the µ. Two symmetric players i and j (i.e., v(T ∪ i) = v(T ∪j)
for all T ⊆N such that i, j 6∈ T ) may have different D-values; they have the same D-value,
however, when µ ∈F .
2.3 Beyond the Shapley and Banzhaf Value
One important application of the D-value ψ[v;µ] is to distribute the grand collective
performance v(N)−v(∅) among all candidate variables; this requires that the weighting
scheme µ satisfies the functional equation of
∑
i∈N
ψi[v;µ]≡ v(N)−v(∅). (4)
We use “≡” to denote a functional equation which holds equal for any payoff function
v. Thus, the portion ψi[v;µ] of v(N)− v(∅) is explained by variable i. The following
theorem and its corollary relate the D-value ψ[v;µ] with the Shapley value Ψ[v] in the
coalitional game (N,v), defined as (Shapley, 1953):
Ψi[v]
def==
∑
T⊆N
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
n!
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)] . (5)
Theorem 1. For any µ ∈F which satisfies (4), ψi[v;µ] = Ψi[v] for all i ∈ N and µ =
µ[η;SV] for some η.
Corollary 1. If µ= µ[η;SV] for some η, then ψi[v;µ] = Ψi[v] for all i ∈ N.
As ψ[v;µ] is linear and satisfies the dummy player property, it is not surprising that
ψ[v;µ] equals Ψ[v] for some particular class of symmetric µ when (4) holds. Theorem
1 specifically figures out these special distributions. As shown in the theorem and its
corollary, µ is not even unique. In deriving the proof, moreover, we assume neither
v(∅) = 0, nor monotonicity of v, nor superadditivity of v (i.e., v(S ∪T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T )
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for any disjoint subsets S and T of N). All these assumptions are highly artificial in
a practical data modeling situation. For example, let v(T ) be the F-statistic when we
model Y by the linear regression using regressors in T .
In the game theory literature, the Banzhzf value (1965) does not satisfy (4). It is
defined as
bi[v]
def== 12n−1
∑
T⊆N
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)] .
In the next theorem, we associate the Banzhaf value with the D-value ψ[v;µ] through
another subclass µ[η;BV].
Theorem 2. ψi[v;µ] ≡ bi[v] for all i ∈ N if and only if µ = µ[η;BV] for some η with
|η| ≤ 12n .
For both subclasses µ[η;SV] and µ[η;BV], the model S has an expected size n2 . This
could be highly unrealistic, especially when they are applied to big data analytics where
the model size is relatively small compared to a large number of candidate variables. By
contrast, for a µ[η;BN], the model S has an expected size of nη. In Theorem 3, we write
the D-value for the subclass µ[η;BN].
Theorem 3. If µ= µ[η;BN] for some η ∈ (0,1), then
ψi[v;µ] = 1ηγi[v;µ]
= 11−ηλi[v;µ]
=
∑
T⊆N:i∈T
η|T |−1(1−η)n−|T | [v(T )−v(T \ i)] .
(6)
Either over-fitting or under-fitting is a counterpart of exact identification of the true
model. When irrelevant variables join with relevant ones to model the data generating
process, the benefit could be merely a highly inflated fitting statistic without any further
explanatory power, but the price is the loss of significance to the true model variables
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and the curse of dimensionality. On the other hand, a direct consequence of under-fitting
is the omitted-variable bias brought to the true model variables. Thus, we consider an
alternative to (4) and distribute Ev(S)− v(∅), the expected collective performance of
the true model, among the variables in N. We hope that the irrelevant variables in N\S
would have little disturbance to v(S).
Let us try using the functions ψ[v;µ], γ[v;µ], and λ[v;µ] to share the expected model
performance Ev(S)− v(∅) among the players in N. The functional equations for the
distribution of Ev(S)−v(∅) are
∑
i∈N
ψi[v;µ]≡ Ev(S)−v(∅), (7)
∑
i∈N
γi[v;µ]≡ Ev(S)−v(∅), (8)
∑
i∈N
λi[v;µ]≡ Ev(S)−v(∅). (9)
We find that (9) has a unique solution µ ∈ F , as stated in Theorem 4. As the
first part of the theorem implies, we should use the marginal loss component of the
Shapley value, rather than the Shapley value, to address the variable selection issue.
On the contrary, (8) has infinite solutions in F ; but any of the solutions concentrates
its probability mass on δ0 and δ1. Thus, the second part of the theorem may be useful
when we seek up to one feature or the most important feature from N. After selecting
the most important feature, we could continue looking for the second most important
one from the remaining features. Unfortunately, there is no µ ∈F which satisfies (7)
Theorem 4. Assume µ ∈F . Then: 1. (9) holds if and only if µ = µ[0;SV]; 2. (8)
holds if and only if δ0 + δ1 = 1; 3. there exists no µ ∈F which solves (7).
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3 ENDOWMENT BIAS
In our valuation paradigm, we classify two types of marginal effect according to
the mere ownership: i ∈ S or i 6∈ S. In practice, people tend to ascribe more value to
things they own, rather than ones they do not own − even when things are exchangeable
in value. This subjective bias is called the endowment effect or endowment bias (e.g.,
Thaler, 1980; Kahneman et al., 1990). When the variables T ⊆ N are used to model
the dependent variable Y , for example, the significance statistics for each i ∈ T , such
as t-statistic and its p-value, are vulnerable to the selection bias and omitted-variable
bias, among others. Both the selection bias and the omitted-variable bias ultimately
associate with the mere ownership between individual variables and the true model. In
this section, we first define the bias and then analyze the implied bias in the Shapley
value and the implied zero bias in the Banzhaf value. We also propose solutions which
mitigate these biases.
3.1 Zero Bias in the Banzhaf Value
For any i ∈ N, we define its endowment bias κi[v;µ] as the difference between its
expected marginal gain and its expected marginal loss,
κi[v;µ]
def== γi[v;µ]−λi[v;µ].
In the above definition, the uncertainty is only about the relationship between i and
S. In subjective valuation, however, we also need to consider another type of risk which
is the uncertainty of the function v. For example, let us study the marginal production
of i to a firm S. On the one hand, if i is already an employee of the firm (i.e., i∈ S) for a
while, then he or she or the firm would have a clear idea about how much the marginal
14
production is. On the other hand, if i is a potential employee (i.e., i 6∈ S), the marginal
production he or she would bring to the firm is not that clear. Consequently, given S,
the conditional uncertainty in v(S∪ i)− v(S) and v(S)− v(S\ i) differs and the former
one is likely far more significant than the latter one, due to the uncertainty of v. Thus, a
positive κi[v;µ] is preferred in a risk-averse valuation, other things remaining unchanged.
This type of risk could partially explain the vast existence of positive endowment bias.
Uncertainty about v and subjective valuation, however, are beyond the scope of the
current research.
Lemma 1 provides a method to calculate the biases directly without involving the
expected marginal gain or loss. In this lemma, the weights of v(T ) sum to zero, i.e.∑
T⊆N
[
2PT −PT∪i−PT\i
]
= 0; but the bias itself may not.
Lemma 1. For any i ∈ N, κi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N
[
2PT −PT∪i−PT\i
]
v(T )
We consider two forms of endowment unbiasedness. In the strong form of unbiased-
ness, κi[v;µ] = 0 for all i ∈ N. As there is only one parameter η in any of the three
subclasses of F , it could be too restrictive to choose an η to make all κi[v;µ] to zeros.
We thus aggregate κi[v;µ] and set the aggregate to zero,
∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ] = 0. This is our
weak form of unbiasedness. The following theorem indicates a strong association be-
tween the endowment unbiasedness and the Banzhaf value via µ[0;BV], in either form.
For a µ ∈F other than µ[0;BV], we, therefore, seek other unbiased solutions.
Theorem 5. The endowment bias κi[v;µ]≡ 0 for all i ∈ N if and only if µ = µ[0;BV].
Besides, given µ ∈F , the aggregate endowment bias ∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ] ≡ 0 if and only if µ =
µ[0;BV].
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3.2 Diminishing Marginality
In general, the candidate variables in N are modestly correlated with each other. As
a consequence, for any i 6∈ T , its explanatory and predictive power is partially mitigated
by the members of T . Moreover, the larger the set T , the more likely the mitigation.
Thus, superadditivity assumption is highly artificial, and diminishing marginality is
more pervasive in our data modeling and forecast situations.
Let us formally define the diminishing marginality, using a model averaging strategy.
Ideally, we expect the inequality
v(T )−v(T \ i)≥ v(T ∪ j)−v(T )
holds for a typical T ⊆N, i∈T and j 6∈T , as shown in Figure 1. However, it is impractical
for the inequality to hold for every T ⊆N, i ∈ T and j 6∈ T . Thus, we average both sides
of the inequality for all T ’s of size t, all i ∈ T and all j 6∈ T . The average on the left side
and that on the right side are

ωt(v)
def== (t−1)!(n−t)!n!
∑
T⊆N:|T |=t
∑
i∈T
[v(T )−v(T \ i)], t= 1,2, · · · ,n;
pit(v)
def== t!(n−t−1)!n!
∑
T⊆N:|T |=t
∑
j∈N\T
[v(T ∪ j)−v(T )], t= 0,1, · · · ,n−1.
In terms of model averaging, we say v has a diminishing marginal effect if ωt(v) ≥
pit(v) for t= 1,2, · · · ,n−1. We also say v has a diminishing marginal gain (or diminishing
marginal loss) if ωt(v) (or pit(v), respectively) is a decreasing function of t. Theorem 6
establishes the equivalence among these types of diminishing marginality.
Theorem 6. pit(v) = ωt+1(v) for t = 0,1, · · · ,n− 1. Consequently, the following state-
ments are equivalent: 1. v has a diminishing marginal effect; 2. v has a diminishing
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marginal gain; 3. v has a diminishing marginal loss.
When used in modeling and forecasting, the Shapley value, however, tends to demon-
strate substantial evidence of negative endowment bias, primarily due to the diminishing
marginal effect of v. This counterintuitive issue could bring the users undesirable in-
ference from the data and eventually limits the usage of the value. This negative bias
is formally claimed in the first part of Theorem 7. The second part could account for
another reason for the pervasiveness of the positive endowment bias.
Theorem 7. Assume µ = µ[0;SV]. If v has a diminishing marginal effect, then the
aggregate bias
∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ]≤ 0; if v is super-additive, then the aggregate bias
∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ]≥
0.
3.3 An Unbiased Solution
In an objective valuation, such as variable selection, either positive or negative en-
dowment bias should be avoided. To systematically mitigate the aggregate endowment
bias
n∑
j=1
κj [v;µ], one could unevenly weight the dichotomous marginal effects and study
an unbiased D-value defined as
ψ˜i[v;µ]
def== (1−α)γi[v;µ] + (1 +α)λi[v;µ] (10)
where
α
def==
∑
j∈N
κj [v;µ]∑
j∈N
ψj [v;µ]
(11)
is the ratio between the aggregate endowment bias and the aggregate D-value. We call
α the endowment bias ratio. In the unbiased version, the weighted marginal gain is
(1−α)γi[v;µ] while the weighted marginal loss is (1 +α)λi[v;µ]. Clearly, there is no
17
more aggregate endowment bias in the unbiased D-value ψ˜[v;µ]:
∑
i∈N
(1−α)γi[v;µ]−
∑
i∈N
(1 +α)λi[v;µ]
=
∑
i∈N
(γi[v;µ]−λi[v;µ])−α
∑
i∈N
(γi[v;µ] +λi[v;µ])
= 0.
In general, the endowment bias ratio α lies between −1 and 1 when v is a monotonic
set function, as shown in Figure 2. If α is close to 0, then there is no endowment
bias. If α is significantly positive, then
∑
j∈N
γj [v;µ] >
∑
j∈N
λj [v;µ] and we have a positive
endowment bias; we should place more weights on the marginal loss. In contrast, if α
is significantly negative, then we have negative endowment bias, and we should place
more weights on the marginal gain. Note that (10) does not eliminate the bias for all
i ∈ N and α in (10) depends on both v and µ. For a µ[η;BN], however, the endowment
bias can be entirely removed by (10) for all i ∈N and the endowment bias ratio α relies
on η only, as stated in Theorem 8.
Theorem 8. If µ = µ[η;BN], then κi[v;µ] = (2η− 1)ψi[v;µ] for any i ∈ N. Thus, the
endowment bias ratio α = 2η−1. Furthermore, the unbiased D-value is
ψ˜i[v;µ] = 4(1−η)γi[v;µ]
= 4ηλi[v;µ]
= 4η(1−η)ψi[v;µ]
= 4
∑
T⊆N:i∈T
η|T |(1−η)n−|T |+1[v(T )−v(T \ i)].
For ψi[v;µ[η;BN]] in Theorem 3, the weights on the marginal gain
[
v(T )− v(T \ i)]
sum to 1. As a consequence of Theorem 8, the weights for ψ˜i[v;µ[η;BN]] sum to 4η(1−η),
whose maximum value occurs at η = .5.
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3.4 An Unbiased Shapley Value
One advantage of the binomial prior µ[η;BN] is the flexibility of η. When indepen-
dence is assumed, η is the probability of any given variable being a true model variable.
If µ = µ[η;BN] and η itself has a Beta distribution with parameters (θ,ρ), θ > 0 and
ρ > 0, then
PT =
∫ 1
0
ηθ−1(1−η)ρ−1
β(θ,ρ) η
|T |(1−η)n−|T |dη
= β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |)β(θ,ρ) .
(12)
In the integral, β(·, ·) is the 2-parameter beta function. Thus, model S has an expected
size E[nη] = nθθ+ρ . Clearly, µ ∈F . We marginalize out η in (6) to get its D-value:
ψi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
∫ 1
0
ηθ−1(1−η)ρ−1
β(θ,ρ) η
|T |−1(1−η)n−|T | [v(T )−v(T \ i)]dη
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
β(θ+|T |−1,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ)
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]. (13)
By the definition of (3), it is straightforward to verify that (13) is indeed the D-value
for the probability density (12). Likewise, by Theorem 8, the unbiased D-value is
ψ˜i[v;µ] = 4
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
∫ 1
0
ηθ−1(1−η)ρ−1
β(θ,ρ) η
|T |(1−η)n−|T |+1 [v(T )−v(T \ i)]dη
= 4
∑
T⊆N::T 6=∅
β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |+1)
β(θ,ρ)
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]. (14)
In fact, (14) is a compound of ψ˜i[v;µ[η;BN]] whose bias ratio α= 2η−1 varies according
to the beta density function for η. On the contrary, (10) has a constant bias ratio.
As a special case, when θ = ρ= 1 (i.e., η has the uniform distribution on [0,1]), then
(13) reduces to the Shapley value Ψi[v]. In light of this fact, using (14) with θ = ρ= 1,
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we define the unbiased Shapley value as
Ψ˜i[v]
def== 4
∑
T⊆N
(|T |)!(n−|T |+ 1)!
(n+ 2)!
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]. (15)
For any i ∈ N, the weights on its marginal gain v(T )−v(T \ i) sum to 1 in both the
Shapley value and the Banzhaf value. In the unbiased Shapley value, however, the sum
reduces to 23 , as stated in the first part of Theorem 9. Thus, the weights on the marginal
gain for 32Ψ˜i[v] sums to 1. Using
4(|T |)!(n−|T |+1)!
(n+2)! =
4|T |(n−|T |+1)
(n+1)(n+2)!
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
n! to compare
(5), we find that large underweighting occurs when |T | is far from n+12 . As the expected
model size for µ[η,SV] is n2 , such T ’s are likely underfit or overfit. Hence, we heavily
underweight these situations.
The total amount, v(N)−v(∅), to be distributed in (4) is inflated when S is a proper
subset of N. Similarly, when T is a proper superset of S, v(T ) is over-fit by the irrelevant
variables in T \S. If we use the other irrelevant variables N \T to partially offset the
over-fit part in v(T ), the net amount v(T )− v(N\T ) would likely be closer to v(S). In
(16), we find the unbiased Shapley value sums to a weighted average of v(T )−v(N\T ).
When its size is close to n, T likely contains S. Thus, (16) places more weights on
large-sized T ’s.
Theorem 9. For any i ∈ N, the weights on its marginal gain v(T )− v(T \ i) in the
unbiased Shapley value Ψ˜i[v], defined in (15), sum to 23 . Besides,
∑
i∈N
Ψ˜i[v] =
∑
T⊆N:|T |>n2
4(|T |)!(n−|T |)!(2|T |−n)
(n+ 2)! [v(T )−v(N\T )] . (16)
Among the family of Beta-Binomial distributions for the model size, Theorem 10
provides a few equivalent characterizations of the Shapley value. Not surprisingly, it
reassures about the suitability of the marginal loss component λ[v;µ] in distributing
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the expected model performance Ev(S)− v(∅), if the Shapley value is used in variable
selection.
Theorem 10. Assume µ= µ[η;BN] where η follows a Beta distribution with parameters
(θ,ρ). Then the following are equivalent: (i) ψ[v;µ] = Ψ[v]; (ii)
∑
i∈N
ψi[v;µ] = v(N)−v(∅);
(iii)
∑
i∈N
λi[v;µ] = Ev(S)−v(∅); (iv)
∑
i∈N
γi[v;µ] = v(N)−Ev(S); (v) θ = ρ= 1.
4 ESTIMATION
In this section, we modify the sequential approach in Shapley (1953) to estimate
the D-value, its components, and its unbiased version. For a large n, exact calculation
of the D-value ψ[v;µ] is not practical; thus we seek random sampling techniques to
approximate it. An easy way to approximate the D-value ψ[v;µ] and its components by
random sampling is to randomly draw a large sample of S and then average the marginal
gain and marginal loss in the sample. For a large n, however, some members in N could
be much less represented in the sample of S than other members. On the contrary, this
section studies a random ordering in which each member appears precisely once in the
ordering. We then calculate the added value for all members of the ordering.
4.1 Sequential Implementation
Let Ω be the set of orderings of all candidate variables. There are n! orderings in
total. We randomly take an ordering τ from Ω:
τ : ∅→ i1→ ·· · → i→ ·· · → in.
Let Ξτi be the set of variables in N which precede i in the ordering τ , and let
φτi
def== v(Ξτi ∪ i)−v(Ξτi ).
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Shapley (1953) showed that Ψi[v] = E[φτi ] where the expectation is under the uniform
distribution on Ω. To estimate γ[v;µ], λ[v;µ], and ψ[v;µ] for any µ, we bind the proba-
bility density µ into the sequential increments by letting
φ˜τi
def==
(PΞτ
i
+P
Ξτ
i
∪i)n!
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)!
[
v(Ξτi ∪ i)−v(Ξτi )
]
. (17)
When µ ∈F , φ˜τi reduces to
φ˜τi =
[
(n−|Ξτi |)δ|Ξτ
i
|+ (1 + |Ξτi |)δ|Ξτ
i
|+1
][
v(Ξτi ∪ i)−v(Ξτi )
]
.
Theorem 11. Assume τ has the uniform distribution on Ω. Then E[φ˜τi ] = ψi[v;µ] and γi[v;µ] = E
n!PΞτ
i
∪i
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)!
[
(v(Ξτi ∪ i)−v(Ξτi )
]
,
λi[v;µ] = E
n!PΞτ
i
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)!
[
v(Ξτi ∪ i)−v(Ξτi )
]
.
(18)
When µ ∈F , the two components are
 γi[v;µ] = E(1 + |Ξ
τ
i |)δ|Ξτ
i
|+1
[
v(Ξτi ∪ i)−v(Ξτi )
]
,
λi[v;µ] = E(n−|Ξτi |)δ|Ξτ
i
|
[
v(Ξτi ∪ i)−v(Ξτi )
]
.
(19)
In particular, the Shapley value consists of the following two parts
 γi[v;µ[0,SV]] = E
|Ξτi |+1
n+1
[
v(Ξτi ∪ i)−v(Ξτi )
]
,
λi[v;µ[0,SV]] = En−|Ξ
τ
i |
n+1
[
v(Ξτi ∪ i)−v(Ξτi )
]
,
(20)
and the unbiased Shapley value equals
Ψ˜i[v] = 4E
(|Ξτi |+ 1)(n−|Ξτi |)
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
[
v(Ξτi ∪ i)−v(Ξτi )
]
. (21)
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To estimate the D-value, its components and its unbiased version, we take a large
sample of random orderings from Ω, say τ1, τ2, · · · , τs. Then, we use the average of φ˜τji to
estimate ψi[v;µ], and the average of
4
(∣∣∣Ξτji ∣∣∣+1)(n−∣∣∣Ξτji ∣∣∣)
(n+1)(n+2)
[
v
(
Ξτji ∪ i
)−v (Ξτji )] to estimate
Ψ˜i[v]. Similarly, we also have the following approximations by averages
γi[v;µ] ≈ 1s
s∑
j=1
(
1 + |Ξτji |
)
δ∣∣∣∣Ξτji
∣∣∣∣+1
[
v
(
Ξτji ∪ i
)−v (Ξτji )] ,
λi[v;µ] ≈ 1s
s∑
j=1
(
n−|Ξτji |
)
δ∣∣∣∣Ξτji
∣∣∣∣
[
v
(
Ξτji ∪ i
)−v (Ξτji )] .
when µ ∈F . These four averages converge as the sample size s increases, according
to the large sample theory. At the same time, we could also estimate the variance-
covariance of
(
φ˜τ1, φ˜
τ
2, · · · , φ˜τn
)′. This information together with the convergence rate in
the multidimensional Central Limit Theorem helps to determine a sample size s such
that the sampling errors in the averages are within an acceptable tolerance level at a
high confidence level. Additionally, we can extract the medians, confidence intervals,
and other robust statistics from the sample of φ˜τji , j = 1,2, · · · , s.
The sequential approach is different from the classical stepwise regression procedure.
In the sequential approach, we apply weighted averaging to the incremental v from
directly nested models. The stepwise procedure admits and drops variables based on
their significance test; however, the exact significance level cannot be calculated (e.g.,
Freedman, 1983). As a matter of fact, because of the diminishing marginality, variable
i’s significance tends to become smaller as the size of Ξτi increases; consequently, different
procedures or starting from different models could lead to different selected models. In
particular, sequential approaches for the unbiased D-value are designed to soften the
first-mover advantage. Another drawback of the stepwise procedure is that it heavily
relies on a single criterion, such as the F -statistic or t-statistic. On the contrary, if v
is a significance measure in the sequential approach, the estimated ψ[v;µ] converges as
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the number of random ordering increases; even though i ∈ N is subject to selection bias
and omitted-variable bias in a single random ordering, these biases partially offset each
other in a large number of orderings.
4.2 ψ[v;µ[η,BN]] and ψ˜[v;µ[η,BN]] with an Unknown η
When µ= µ[η;BN] for an unknown η ∈ (0,1), the estimated model Sˆ indeed depends
on the choice of η. Meanwhile, we can also estimate η from the relationship E|S|= nη.
Thus, we could estimate η and S recursively by the following algorithm:
Step 1: set a starting value for ηˆ;
Step 2: use µ= µ[ηˆ;BN] and Theorem 11 to find an estimated model Sˆ;
Step 3: update η by ηˆ = |Sˆ|n ;
Step 4: repeat Step 2 and Step 3 until both ηˆ and Sˆ converge.
An underlying assumption in the third step is that the expected size of Sˆ is |S| in
Step 2. This assumption could be highly unrealistic unless the iteration converges to
a single point regardless of the starting value of ηˆ, specified in Step 1. The number of
selected variables by the unbiased Shapley value method, divided by n, could act as a
proper starting value for ηˆ, if the computational cost is not a concern.
In Step 2, we only need to estimate either γ[v;µ[η;BN]] or λ[v;µ[η;BN]] from (19).
Then ψ[v;µ[η;BN]] and ψ˜[v;µ[η;BN]] follow from the formulas in Theorems 3 and 8,
respectively.
5 SIMULATION STUDIES
In this section, we compare the performance of eleven variable selection methods
in 1000 simulated models. The methods include LASSO, stepwise regression, three
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information-criterion approaches (AIC, BIC, and Hannan-Quinn), the Shapley value
Ψ[v] and its components γ[v;µ[0;SV]] and λ[v;µ[0;SV]], the unbiased Shapley value
Ψ˜[v], the biased D-value ψ[v;µ[η;BN]] and its unbiased one ψ˜[v;µ[η;BN]] with a binomial
model size. In terms of exact identification of the true models, Ψ˜[v], γ[v;µ[0;SV]], and
λ[v;µ[0;SV]] perform significantly better than the others. In contrast to their biased
opponents, the two unbiased D-value methods, Ψ˜[v] and ψ˜[v;µ[η;BN]], well succeed in
resolving the over-fitting issue.
5.1 The Data and Models
In this experiment, we first study 1000 linear regression models. Each model has
a dependent variable Y and 20 candidate explanatory variables {Xi}20i=1. The true
relationship is
Y = ζ0 +
5∑
i=1
ζiXi+
20∑
i=6
0×Xi+  (22)
for some model-specific coefficients ζi and white noise . Thus, the true model variables
are S = {X1, · · · ,X5}.
Each model has a dataset of 100 simulated observations. In generating a dataset, we
first simulate 20 independent variables using the normal random number generator. We
then transform them by the exponential, logarithmic of absolute value, square and cubic
functions. We next simulate a set of 6 coefficients ζi, including the constant intercept
ζ0. Finally, we apply (22) to calculate the dependent variable Y , using the intercept,
the first five regressors and their coefficients, plus white noise .
For each simulated dataset, we apply any of the eleven variable selection methods
to find an estimated model Sˆ. We then compute the discrepancy between the selected
variables in Sˆ and the true model variables in S. The discrepancy includes the number
of not-selected true model variables, the number of selected irrelevant variables from
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{Xi}20i=16, and the size of the selected model Sˆ. Finally, we aggregate the discrepancy
statistics for all 1000 datasets and models.
5.2 Cut-off by Statistical Significance
For simplicity, we let v(T ) be the sum of absolute value of t-statistics of all variables
in T when used to model the dependent variable Y . One advantage of this performance
function v is that the variable with the maximum unbiased Shapley value is likely the
most statistically significant, as t-statistic itself is a measure of significance. One could
also use other variants, such as the F-statistic or the sum of squared t-statistics.
In this experiment, we use the following iterative algorithm for the Ψ˜[v] method:
Step 1: Apply the sequential approach in Theorem 11 to pick the variable
x(1) which has the largest unbiased Shapley value and which is
also statistically significant. If x(1) is non-significant, then stop
and set Sˆ = ∅; otherwise, add x(1) to Sˆ.
Step 2: Apply the sequential approach to the remaining variables while
keeping x(1) as a regressor; pick the statistically-significant vari-
able x(2) which has the largest unbiased Shapley value. Stop if
x(2) is not significant; otherwise, add x(2) to Sˆ.
Step 3: Apply the sequential approach to the remaining variables while
keeping x(1) and x(2) as regressors; pick the significant variable
x(3) which has the largest unbiased Shapley value. Stop if x(3) is
not significant; otherwise, add x(3) to Sˆ.
Step 4: We continue the above fashion until the remaining variable with
the largest unbiased Shapley value is no longer significant.
The prior belief about S is updated in each step of the above algorithm. Before
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Step 1, each variable is equally like to be a relevant one. After Step 1 and before Step
2, x(1) is included in Sˆ with significant confidence and all other variables in N \ {x(1)}
are equally likely to be selected. After Step 2 and before Step 3, x(2) is included in Sˆ
with conditionally significant confidence, and all other variables in N \ {x(1),x(2)} are
equally likely to be selected. Thus, in the above Steps 2 and 3, the function v and the
unbiased Shapley value are restricted on the player sets of N\{x(1)} and N\{x(1),x(2)},
respectively.
We apply similar iterative algorithms to the Ψ[v], γ[v;µ[0;SV]], and λ[v;µ[0;SV]]
methods. For ψ[v;µ[η;BN]] and ψ˜[v;µ[η;BN]], we assume that η is unknown and use the
algorithm in Section 4.2 to estimate both η and S iteratively. In the experiment, we use
100 random orderings in estimating Ψ[v], γ[v;µ[0;SV]], λ[v;µ[0;SV]], Ψ˜[v], ψ[v;µ[η;BN]],
and ψ˜[v;µ[η;BN]].
For the AIC-, BIC-, and H-Q (Hannan-Quinn)-based subset search methods, we
search all 2n subsets of N for each dataset and choose the subset with the smallest
information value as the estimated model Sˆ.
For the LASSO method, we also apply tenfold cross-validation. This method and
cross-validation are implemented in the software MatLab.
There are many stepwise regression methods in the literature; we adopt the best
results produced by the software EViews.
5.3 The Comparison
With any of the eleven variable selection methods, we attempt to drop all the ir-
relevant variables in N \S and keep all the relevant ones in S. Ideally, the estimated
model Sˆ should exactly match the true model S, i.e., Sˆ = S. In reality, however, the
selection method could make two types of error: on the one hand, if Sˆ\S 6= ∅, then some
irrelevant variables are falsely selected by the selection method; on the other hand, if
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S\ Sˆ 6= ∅, then some true model variables fail to be selected by the method. In a large
number of simulated models, a good variable selection method should correctly identify
a large percentage of the true models and should make a small percentage of errors.
Table 1 summarizes the discrepancy statistics for all these eleven methods in the 1000
simulated models. We focus on three novel methods in the table: Ψ˜[v], γ[v;µ[0;SV]],
and λ[v;µ[0;SV]].
The second row is the numbers of exactly identified models out of the 1000 simulated
models. The three methods have an accuracy of 90%. The next best one, ψ˜[v;µ[η;BN]],
has an accuracy of 78%.
Rows 3-5 are the numbers of estimated models which reject relevant variables. These
numbers measure the under-fitting of the selection methods. We notice that all these
three methods are not good at resolving the under-fitting issue. On average, they accept
irrelevant variables with 9% chance.
In rows 6-10, we list the numbers of estimated models which include irrelevant vari-
ables. These numbers measure the over-fitting of the selection methods. All three
methods extremely well succeed in blocking the irrelevant variables from being selected.
The average chance to make this type of error is only 1.7%.
Rows 11-19 list the sizes of the estimated models. The three methods have average
accuracy of 90% in correctly determining the model sizes.
Lastly, the advantage of the unbiasedness is manifested in the contrast of Ψ˜[v] versus
Ψ[v] and that of ψ˜[v;µ[η;BN]] versus ψ[v;µ[η;BN]]. The unbiased D-value methods
outperform their biased ones by 70%, in terms of exact identification. The unbiasedness
reduces 78% over-fit models.
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5.4 Robustness Checks
In this section so far, the data and the true models are generated by Monte Carlo
simulation so that the true models are known by design. For simplicity, orthogonalization
is assumed among the candidate variables; cross-products, endogeneity, and lags are not
allowed. In the rest of this section, we conduct two robustness checks. Both checks
reconfirm the effectiveness of our new methodologies.
In the first robustness check, we apply a linear transformation to the 20 independent
variables after created by the random number generator and before applied by any
other transformations. By the linear transformation, we add correlation among the
candidate variables. For each dataset, the transform matrix is also randomly generated.
We tabulate the discrepancy statistics in Table 2. Not surprisingly, Ψ˜[v], γ[v;µ[0;SV]],
λ[v;µ[0;SV]], and ψ˜[v;µ[η;BN]] perform even better in the situations with correlated
candidate regressors and with even stronger diminishing marginality.
In the second robustness check, we increase the size of the true model variables to
twelve, i.e., the true model changes to
Y = ζ0 +
12∑
i=1
ζiXi+
20∑
i=13
0×Xi+ .
We still allow the cross-dependence among the candidate regressors. The discrepancy
statistics are listed in Table 3. The results are consistent with those in Tables 1 and 2.
6 CONCLUSIONS
When observing the performance v over all subsets of the candidate variables in N,
we obtain a real coalitional game (N,v). For this game, the current research essentially
supplies three new features to the Shapley value. First, we decompose the value into an
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expected marginal loss and an expected marginal gain, assuming a particular type of non-
informative priors. While the value itself attributes the grand performance v(N)−v(∅),
the marginal loss attributes the expected performance Ev(S)− v(∅) of the true model
S, which is the proper amount to be shared in the variable selection setting. Secondly,
the expected marginal loss is not half of the value. For a given model size |S|, the
average marginal loss is no more than the average marginal gain, due to the diminishing
marginality. To mitigate the asymmetry, we define an unbiased value by unequally
weighting the gain and loss. Lastly, the Shapley value or its unbiased version can be
represented as a compound of another class of D-value. In this class, the expected model
size could be either small or large, compared to the number of available candidates.
The framework we provide here opens new areas of applications and suggests im-
provement on how to apply the Shapley value. Our nonparametric method assumes few
assumptions on the models and the performance function. It also allows for the ex-
planatory variables’ heterogeneous effects in different modeling situations, which is the
starting point for the D-value. Most importantly, our approach addresses the asymmet-
ric sides of the marginal effects. In a practical application, the estimated model consists
of variables which have significant unbiased D-value ψ˜[v;µ]. The selected variables, how-
ever, may not have the best collective performance under a specific scenario. The model
with the best performance under the scenario, on the other hand, does not necessarily
produce the best performance under other scenarios. This dilemma leads us to evaluate
the variables, not in one specific modeling situation, but various modeling scenarios.
Depending on specific contexts, similar ideas can be applied to other areas in eco-
nomics, political science, and statistics. For example, Hu (2006) applies ψ[v, [η,SV]] and
ψ[v, [0,BV]] to simple games in order to measure the voting power in the games. In a
labor market, Hu (2018) uses the aggregate marginal gain and marginal loss to allocate
the net profit between the employed and the unemployed labor. In detecting outlier ob-
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servations in statistics, one could apply the unbiased D-value ψ˜i to evaluate the overall
performance of each observation. For example, consider the MCD estimator of robust
covariance (e.g., Rousseeuw, 1985). Among all covariances of subsamples of a given size,
the MCD estimator has the minimum determinant. We let N be the full sample of ob-
servations and T be a subsample. Let v(T ) be the determinant of the covariance of the
subsample T . We can reasonably assume no discrimination on any subsample among all
subsamples of the same size. A µ[η;BN] with η ∈ [.95, .99] could be a good distribution
choice for the set of non-outliers observations.
We could extend the D-value from different angles. One way is structural valuation.
In a real valuation situation, it could be proper to specify a context-specific µ. For
example, in a voting context, let |S| have a uniform distribution on the integers in
bn/4,3n/4c, rather than on the integers in [0,n]. Structural valuation can also be done
by placing restrictions on µ. For example, if players i and j would never cooperate in
the voting, then the probability of ij ∈ S should be zero. Though the analytic formula
is unlikely available for ψ[v;µ] under a restricted µ, Monte Carlo method is generally
feasible. In the Monte Carlo simulations, we ignore the restricted cases from the sample
of randomly simulated S. Another type of extensions is to alleviate the functional
equation (4), (7), (8), or (9), which requires 2n identity restrictions. For example, Hu
(2018) only requires the equality holds at a specific S, which does happen. For another
example, we could seek a unique µ[η,BN] which minimizes the discrepancy between the
weights on the left and right sides of (7), (8), or (9).
Efficient computation of the D-value and its unbiased version, however, remains a
challenge when n is large. In the literature, there are many algorithms for computing
the Shapley value. Variants of them could be used to calculate ψ[v,µ], ψ˜[v,µ], and their
components. Besides, we could also refine the algorithms in Section 4. For example,
one could dynamically determine the number of random orderings based on the already
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calculated sample mean and sample variance of φ˜τji . For another example, the reversal
of a new random ordering may be re-used as the next ordering. When the computational
cost of v(T ) is high, we could save it in a data structure (e.g., a hash table) such that
we compute it only once. In the algorithm of Section 5.2, we consecutively admit one
new variable or admit nothing. We could also drop one or drop nothing at the same
time. Multiple admissions or drops at one time could also be possible if the admitted
or dropped variables are far different from the others, regarding both unbiased Shapley
value and statistical significance.
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Appendix
A1. Proof of Theorem 1
For any fixed i ∈ N, we re-write (3) as
ψi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N:T3i
PT [v(T )−v(T \ i)] +
∑
Z⊆N\i
PZ [v(Z ∪ i)−v(Z)]
Q=T\i=
∑
T⊆N:T3i
PT v(T )−
∑
Q⊆N\i
P
Q∪iv(Q) +
∑
Z⊆N\i
PZ [v(Z ∪ i)−v(Z)]
Z=Q=
∑
T⊆N:T3i
PT v(T ) +
∑
Z⊆N\i
PZv(Z ∪ i)−
∑
Z⊆N\i
[PZ +PZ∪i ]v(Z)
T=Z∪i=
∑
T⊆N:T3i
PT v(T ) +
∑
T⊆N:T3i
P
T\iv(T )−
∑
Z⊆N\i
[PZ +PZ∪i ]v(Z)
T=Z=
∑
T⊆N:T3i
v(T )[PT +PT\i ]−
∑
T⊆N\i
v(T )[PT +PT∪i ].
(A.1)
Therefore, by (4),
v(N)−v(∅) ≡ ∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T3i
v(T )[PT +PT\i ]−
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N\i
v(T )[PT +PT∪i ]
≡ ∑
T⊆N
v(T )
∑
i∈T
[PT +PT\i ]−
∑
T⊆N
v(T )
∑
i∈N\T
[PT +PT∪i ]
≡ ∑
T⊆N
v(T )
[
|T |PT +
∑
i∈T
P
T\i− (n−|T |)PT −
∑
i∈N\T
P
T∪i
]
≡ ∑
T⊆N
v(T )
[∑
i∈T
P
T\i + (2|T |−n)PT −
∑
i∈N\T
P
T∪i
]
.
(A.2)
We compare the coefficients of v(N) and v(∅) in (A.2) to get
 nδn+ δn−1 = 1,−nδ0− δ1 =−1. (A.3)
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For any T ⊆ N such that T 6= N and T 6= ∅, the coefficient of v(T ) in (A.2) implies that
∑
i∈T
P
T\i + (2|T |−n)PT −
∑
i∈N\T
P
T∪i = 0.
As µ ∈F , PT = (|T |)!(n−|T |)!n! δ|T | . Let |T | = t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n− 1, and re-write the above
equation in terms of δt,
t
(t−1)!(n− t+ 1)!
n! δt−1 + (2t−n)
t!(n− t)!
n! δt− (n− t)
(t+ 1)!(n− t−1)!
n! δt+1 = 0.
Or simply, for 1≤ t≤ n−1,
(n− t+ 1)δt−1 + (2t−n)δt− (t+ 1)δt+1 = 0. (A.4)
Using (A.3), (A.4) and
n∑
t=0
δt = 1, we have n+ 2 linear equations of n+ 1 unknowns
as

−n −1
n 2−n −2
n−1 4−n −3
. . . . . . . . .
2 n−2 −n
1 n
1 1 1 · · · · · · 1 1 1


δ0
δ1
δ2
...
δn−2
δn−1
δn

=

−1
0
0
...
0
1
1

.
In the (n+ 2)× (n+ 1) coefficient matrix, we add the 1st row to the 2nd row, add
the new 2nd row to the 3rd row, add the new 3rd row to the 4th row, et cetera, and
add the new n-th row to the n+1st row. Finally, we add 1n of the sum of the first n new
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rows to the last row. In the result matrix, the last two rows are zeros. After removing
the last two rows, we have the new system of equations

−n −1
1−n −2
2−n −3
. . . . . .
−1 −n


δ0
δ1
...
δn−1
δn

=

−1
−1
...
−1
−1

.
The new n×(n+1) coefficient matrix has rank n and thus we may write δ0 = 1n+1 +η
for some indeterminate η. Using mathematical induction, we find the general solution
to the system of equations is
δt =
1
n+ 1 + (−1)
t
 n
t
η. (A.5)
Any η with |η| ≤ min
s=0,1,...,n
s!(n−s)!
(n+1)! =
(bn+12 c)!(n−bn+12 c)!
(n+1)! guarantees the non-negativity of
all δt’s and µ[η;SV] being a probability distribution. By (A.5), for any T ⊆ N,
PT =
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
(n+ 1)! + (−1)
|T |η.
Therefore,
 PT +PT\i =
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
n! , ∀ T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅, ∀i ∈ T ;
PT +PT∪i =
(|T |)!(n−|T |−1)!
n! , ∀ T ⊆ N, T 6= N, ∀i 6∈ T.
(A.6)
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Finally, we plug (A.6) into (A.1),
ψi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N:T3i
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
n! v(T )−
∑
T⊆N\i
(|T |)!(n−|T |−1)!
n! v(T )
Z=T∪i=
∑
T⊆N:T3i
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
n! v(T )−
∑
Z⊆N:Z3i
(|Z|−1)!(n−|Z|)!
n! v(Z \ i)
T=Z=
∑
T⊆N
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
n! [v(T )−v(T \ i)]
= Ψi[v]. 
(A.7)
A2. Proof of Corollary 1
If PT =
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
(n+1)! + (−1)|T |η for some η, we repeat (A.6)−(A.7) to get ψi[v;µ] =
Ψi[v] for all i ∈ N. 
A3. Proof of Theorem 2
If PT = 12n +(−1)|T |η for any T ⊆N, then PT +PT\i = PT +PT∪j = 12n−1 for any i ∈ T
and any j 6∈ T . By (A.1),
ψi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N:T3i
1
2n−1v(T )−
∑
T⊆N:T 63i
1
2n−1v(T )
Z=T∪i= 12n−1
∑
T⊆N:T3i
v(T )− 12n−1
∑
Z⊆N:Z3i
v(Z \ i)
Z=T= 12n−1
∑
T⊆N:T3i
[v(T )−v(T \ i)]
= bi[v].
On the other hand, if ψi[v;µ]≡ bi[v] for all i ∈ N, then
ψi[v;µ] = 12n−1
∑
T⊆N
[v(T )−v(T \ i)]
=
∑
T⊆N:T3i
1
2n−1v(T )−
∑
T⊆N:T 63i
1
2n−1v(T ).
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By (A.1),
PT +PT\i =
1
2n−1 , ∀ i ∈ T. (A.8)
Without loss of generality, let P∅ =
1
2n +η for some η with |η| ≤ 12n . Thus, a simple
implication of (A.8) is P
i
= 12n−1 −P∅ = 12n −η for any i ∈ N. For any T ⊆ N and T 6= ∅,
we write T as T = i1i2i3 · · · i|T | . We consecutively drop two elements from T using (A.8),
PT = Pi3i4···i|T |
= · · ·=

P
i|T |
= 12n−1 −P∅ = 12n −η, if |T | is odd;
P∅ =
1
2n +η, if |T | is even.
Therefore, PT = 12n + (−1)|T |η for any T ⊆ N. 
A4. Proof of Theorem 3
Using (1), (2), and (3) with µ= µ[η;BN], we have
γi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N:T3i
η|T |(1−η)n−|T |[v(T )−v(T \ i)]
λi[v;µ] =
∑
Z⊆N:Z 63i
η|Z|(1−η)n−|Z|[v(Z ∪ i)−v(Z)]
T=Z∪i=
∑
T⊆N:T3i
η|T |−1(1−η)n−|T |+1[v(T )−v(T \ i)]
ψi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N:T3i
[
η|T |(1−η)n−|T |+η|T |−1(1−η)n−|T |+1
][
v(T )−v(T \ i)]
=
∑
T⊆N:T3i
η|T |−1(1−η)n−|T |[v(T )−v(T \ i)]. 
A5. Proof of Theorem 4
For any µ ∈F ,
Ev(S) =
∑
T⊆N
PT v(T ) =
∑
T⊆N
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
n! δ|T |v(T ).
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To prove the first part, we write the total expected marginal loss in terms of v(T ),
∑
i∈N
λi[v;µ] =
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N,i6∈T
PT
[
v(T ∪ i)−v(T )]
=
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N,i6∈T
PT v(T ∪ i)−
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N,i6∈T
PT v(T )
Z=T∪i=
∑
i∈N
∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=∅,i∈Z
P
Z\iv(Z)−
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
v(T )
∑
i∈N:i6∈T
PT
T=Z=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
v(T )
∑
i∈T
P
T\i−
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
(n−|T |)(|T |)!(n−|T |)!δ|T |
n! v(T )
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
|T |(|T |−1)!(n−|T |+1)!δ|T |−1
n! v(T ) + δn−1v(N)
− ∑
T⊆N:T 6=N,T 6=∅
(n−|T |)(|T |)!(n−|T |)!δ|T |
n! v(T )−nδ0v(∅)
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
[
(n−|T |+1)δ|T |−1−(n−|T |)δ|T |
]
n! v(T )
+δn−1v(N)−nδ0v(∅).
For (9) to hold, we compare the coefficients of v(T ) on both sides of (9):

δn−1 = δn,
−nδ0 = δ0−1,
(n− t+ 1)δt−1− (n− t)δt = δt, ∀ 1≤ t≤ n−1.
(A.9)
The solution to the above system is δ0 = δ1 = · · ·= δn = 1n+1 , i.e., µ= µ[0;SV].
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To prove the second part, we write the total expected marginal gain in terms of v(T ),
∑
i∈N
γi[v;µ] =
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,i∈T
PT
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]
=
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,i∈T
PT v(T )−
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,i∈T
PT v(T \ i)
Z=T\i=
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,i∈T
PT v(T )−
∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N
v(Z)
∑
i∈N:i 6∈Z
P
Z∪i
T=Z=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
v(T )
∑
i∈T
PT −
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
(n−|T |)(|T |+1)!(n−|T |−1)!δ|T |+1
n! v(T )
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
|T |(|T |)!(n−|T |)!δ|T |
n! v(T ) +nδnv(N)
− ∑
T⊆N:T 6=N,T 6=∅
(|T |+1)!(n−|T |)!δ|T |+1
n! v(T )− δ1v(∅)
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
[
|T |δ|T |−(|T |+1)δ|T |+1
]
n! v(T )
+nδnv(N)− δ1v(∅).
For (8) to hold, we compare the coefficients of v(T ) on both sides of (8):

nδn = δn,
−δ1 = δ0−1,
tδt− (t+ 1)δt+1 = δt, ∀ 1≤ t≤ n−1.
(A.10)
The solution to the above system is δ0 + δ1 = 1 and δ2 = δ3 = · · ·= δn = 0.
To prove the last part, we capitalize on the relation
∑
i∈N
ψi[v;µ] =
∑
i∈N
γi[v;µ]+
∑
i∈N
λi[v;µ].
For (7) to hold, we use (A.9) and (A.10) to get

δn−1 +nδn = δn,
−nδ0− δ1 = δ0−1,
(n− t+ 1)δt−1− (n− t)δt+ tδt− (t+ 1)δt+1 = δt, ∀ 1≤ t≤ n−1.
(A.11)
The first equation in (A.11), together with δn ≥ 0 and δn−1 ≥ 0, implies that δn =
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δn−1 = 0. We then apply δn = δn−1 = 0 to the third equation in (A.11), i.e. δt−1 =
(t+1)δt+1−(2t−n−1)δt
n−t+1 , for t= n−1,n−2, · · · ,1. We get all δt = 0, which contradicts to the
second equation in (A.11). Therefore, there exists no solution µ ∈F which solves (7).

A6. Proof of Lemma 1
κi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N:T3i
PT
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]− ∑
Z⊆N\i
PZ
[
v(Z ∪ i)−v(Z)]
=
[ ∑
T⊆N:T3i
PT v(T ) +
∑
Z⊆N\i
PZv(Z)
]
− ∑
T⊆N:T3i
PT v(T \ i)
− ∑
Z⊆N\i
PZv(Z ∪ i)
Q=Z∪i=
∑
T⊆N
PT v(T )−
∑
T⊆N:T3i
PT v(T \ i)−
∑
Q⊆N:Q3i
P
Q\iv(Q)
Z=T\i=
∑
T⊆N
PT v(T )−
∑
Z⊆N\i
P
Z∪iv(Z)−
∑
Q⊆N
P
Q\iv(Q) +
∑
Q⊆N\i
P
Q\iv(Q)
T=Q=
∑
T⊆N
[
PT −PT\i
]
v(T )− ∑
Z⊆N\i
P
Z∪iv(Z) +
∑
T⊆N\i
PT v(T )
=
∑
T⊆N
[
PT −PT\i
]
v(T )− ∑
Z⊆N
P
Z∪iv(Z) +
∑
Z⊆N:Z3i
P
Z∪iv(Z)
+
∑
T⊆N\i
PT v(T )
T=Z=
∑
T⊆N
[
PT −PT\i−PT∪i
]
v(T ) +
[ ∑
T⊆N:T3i
PT v(T ) +
∑
T⊆N\i
PT v(T )
]
=
∑
T⊆N
[
2PT −PT∪i−PT\i
]
v(T ). 
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A7. Proof of Theorem 5
Part I: If PT = 12n for any T ⊆ N, then 2PT −PT∪i −PT\i = 0 for any i ∈ N and
T ⊆ N. By Lemma 1,
κi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N
[
2PT −PT∪i−PT\i
]
v(T ) = 0
for any i ∈ N.
On the other hand, if κi[v;µ] ≡ 0 for all i ∈ N, then Lemma 1 implies that 2PT −
P
T∪i−PT\i = 0 for any i ∈N and any T ⊆N. A simply implication is that PT = PT\i for
any i ∈ T ⊆ N. For any T ⊆ N and T 6= ∅, we write T as T = i1i2 · · · i|T | . Now
PT = Pi2i3···i|T |
= P
i3i4···i|T |
= · · ·= P
i|T |
= P∅ .
As
∑
T⊆N
PT = 1, we have 2nP∅ = 1 and PT = P∅ =
1
2n for any T ⊆ N.
Part II: If µ= µ[0;BV], then Lemma 1 implies that κi[v;µ] = 0 for all i ∈N. There-
fore,
∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ] = 0.
On the other hand, we assume
∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ]≡ 0 and µ∈F . Using PT =
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!δ|T |
n!
44
and Lemma 1, we simplify the aggregate bias:
∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N
v(T )
∑
i∈N
[
2PT −PT∪i−PT\i
]
=
∑
T⊆N:1≤|T |<n
v(T )
[
2nPT −|T |PT −
∑
i∈N\T
P
T∪i− (n−|T |)PT −
∑
i∈T
P
T\i
]
+(nδn− δn−1)v(N) + (nδ0− δ1)v(∅)
=
∑
T⊆N:1≤|T |<n
v(T )
[
nPT −
∑
i∈N\T
P
T∪i−
∑
i∈T
P
T\i
]
+(nδn− δn−1)v(N) + (nδ0− δ1)v(∅)
=
∑
T⊆N:1≤|T |≤n
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
[
nδ|T |−(|T |+1)δ|T |+1−(n−|T |+1)δ|T |−1
]
n! v(T )
+(nδn− δn−1)v(N) + (nδ0− δ1)v(∅)
(A.12)
Therefore, by
∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ]≡ 0,

nδn− δn−1 = 0
nδ0− δ1 = 0
nδt− (t+ 1)δt+1− (n− t+ 1)δt−1 = 0, ∀ t= 1,2, ...,n−1.
By mathematical induction on t, it is not hard to see that δt = n!t!(n−t)!δ0 for any
t= 1,2, ...,n. Finally, as
n∑
t=0
δt = 1, we get δ0 = 12n and
PT =
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
n! δ|T | =
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
n!
n!
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!δ0 =
1
2n . 
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A8. Proof of Theorem 6
By the definitions of pit(v) and ωt(v),
pit(v) = t!(n−t−1)!n!
∑
T⊆N:|T |=t,i∈N\T
[
v(T ∪ i)−v(T )]
Z=T∪i= ((t+1)−1)!(n−(t+1))!n!
∑
Z⊆N:|Z|=t+1,i∈Z
[
v(Z)−v(Z \ i)]
= ωt+1(v).
Therefore, ωt(v) ≥ pit(v) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n− 1 if and only if ωt(v) ≥ ωt+1(v) for all
1 ≤ t ≤ n− 1; equivalently, ωt(v) is a decreasing function of t. In the same fashion,
ωt(v) ≥ pit(v) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n− 1 if and only if pit−1(v) ≥ pit(v) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n− 1;
equivalently, pit(v) is a decreasing function of t. 
A9. Proof of Theorem 7
Part I: If PT =
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
(n+1)! and v has diminishing marginality, then
∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
(n+1)!
∑
i∈T
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]
− ∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|)!
(n+1)!
∑
i∈N\Z
[
v(Z ∪ i)−v(Z)]
T=Z∪i=
n∑
t=1
∑
T⊆N:|T |=t
t!(n−t)!
(n+1)!
∑
i∈T
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]
− ∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
(|T |−1)!(n+1−|T |)!
(n+1)!
∑
i∈T
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]
=
n∑
t=1
t
n+1ωt(v)−
n∑
t=1
∑
T⊆N:|T |=t
(t−1)!(n+1−t)!
(n+1)!
∑
i∈T
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]
=
n∑
t=1
t
n+1ωt(v)−
n∑
t=1
n+1−t
n+1 ωt(v)
=
n∑
t=1
2t
n+1ωt(v)−
n∑
t=1
ωt(v)
= n
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
( 2t
n+1
)
ωt(v)−
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
2t
n+1
)(
1
n
n∑
t=1
ωt(v)
)]
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which is the sample covariance, multiplied by n, between the series
{ 2t
n+1
}n
t=1 and the
series {ωt(v)}nt=1. As 2tn+1 is increasing in t while ωt(v) is decreasing in t, the sample
covariance is non-positive. Therefore,
∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ]≤ 0.
Part II: If v is super-additive, then v(∅) = 0 (e.g., Megiddo, 1988). Denote
∆1
def=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!∑
i∈T
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)],
∆2
def=
∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|)! ∑
i∈N\Z
[
v(Z ∪ i)−v(Z)].
Note that ∆1 equals
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
|T |(|T |)!(n−|T |)!v(T )− ∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
∑
i∈T
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!v(T \ i)
Z=T\i=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
|T |(|T |)!(n−|T |)!v(T )− ∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N
∑
i∈N\Z
(|Z|+ 1)!(n−|Z|−1)!v(Z)
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
|T |(|T |)!(n−|T |)!v(T )− ∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N
(|Z|+ 1)!(n−|Z|)!v(Z),
and ∆2 equals
∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|)!∑
i6∈Z
v(Z ∪ i)− ∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|)!(n−|Z|)v(Z)
T=Z∪i=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |+ 1)!∑
i∈T
v(T )− ∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|)!(n−|Z|)v(Z)
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
(|T |)!(n−|T |+ 1)!v(T )− ∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|)!(n−|Z|)v(Z).
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Using v(∅) = 0 and v(T ) +v(N\T )≤ v(N), we can write ∆1−∆2 as
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!(2|T |−n−1)v(T )
+
∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|)!(n−2|Z|−1)v(Z)
= n!(n−1)v(N) + ∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!(2|T |−n)v(T )
+
∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N,Z 6=∅
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|)!(n−2|Z|)v(Z)
− ∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!v(T )− ∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N,Z 6=∅
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|)!v(Z)
= n!(n−1)v(N)− ∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!v(T )
− ∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N,Z 6=∅
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|)!v(Z)
T=N\Z= n!(n−1)v(N)− ∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
(|T |)!(n−|T |)![v(T ) +v(N\T )]
≥ n!(n−1)v(N)− ∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!v(N) (by superadditivity)
= n!(n−1)v(N)−v(N)
n−1∑
t=1
∑
T⊆N:|T |=t
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
= n!(n−1)v(N)−v(N)
n−1∑
t=1
n!
= 0.
Finally, for the super-additive v with µ= µ[0;SV],
∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ] =
∆1
(n+ 1)! −
∆2
(n+ 1)! =
∆1−∆2
(n+ 1)! ≥ 0. 
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A10. Proof of Theorem 8
By Theorem 3 and (11),
κi[v;µ] = γi[v;µ]−λi[v;µ] α =
∑
i∈N
κi[v;µ] /
∑
i∈N
ψi[v;µ]
= ηψi[v;µ]− (1−η)ψi[v;µ] =
∑
i∈N
(2η−1)ψi[v;µ] /
∑
i∈N
ψi[v;µ]
= (2η−1)ψi[v;µ], = 2η−1.
Furthermore, by (10) and Theorem 3,
ψ˜i[v;µ] = [1− (2η−1)]γi[v;µ] + [1 + (2η−1)]λi[v;µ]
= 2(1−η)ηψi[v;µ] + 2η(1−η)ψi[v;µ]
= 4η(1−η)ψi[v;µ]
= 4
∑
T⊆N
η|T |(1−η)n−|T |+1 [v(T )−v(T \ i)] . 
A11. Proof of Theorem 9
Part I: The weight for the marginal gain v(T )− v(T \ i) in the unbiased Shapley
value Ψ˜i[v] defined in (15) is 4(|T |)!(n−|T |+1)!(n+2)! for any T 3 i. The total weight over all
T 3 i is then
∑
T⊆N:T3i
4(|T |)!(n−|T |+1)!
(n+2)! =
n∑
t=1
∑
T⊆N:|T |=t,T3i
4t!(n−t+1)!
(n+2)!
=
n∑
t=1
4t!(n−t+1)!
(n+2)!
(n−1)!
(t−1)!(n−t)!
=
n∑
t=1
4(tn−t2+t)
n(n+1)(n+2)
= 4n(n+1)n2n(n+1)(n+2) −
4n(n+1)(2n+1)
6n(n+1)(n+2) +
4n(n+1)
2n(n+1)(n+2)
= 23 .
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Part II: Using (15), we write
∑
i∈N
Ψ˜i[v] as
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:i∈T
4(|T |)!(n−|T |+1)!
(n+2)!
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]
Z=T\i=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
∑
i∈T
4(|T |)!(n−|T |+1)!
(n+2)! v(T )−
∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=N
∑
i6∈Z
4(|Z|+1)!(n−|Z|)!
(n+2)! v(Z)
T=Z=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
4|T |(|T |)!(n−|T |+1)!
(n+2)! v(T )−
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
4(n−|T |)(|T |+1)!(n−|T |)!
(n+2)! v(T )
= 4nn!(n+2)! [v(N)−v(∅)] +
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N,T 6=∅
4(|T |)!(n−|T |)!(2|T |−n)!
(n+2)! v(T )
= 4nn!(n+2)! [v(N)−v(∅)] +
∑
T⊆N:n2<|T |<n
4(|T |)!(n−|T |)!(2|T |−n)!
(n+2)! v(T )
+
∑
T⊆N:0<|T |<n2
4(|T |)!(n−|T |)!(2|T |−n)!
(n+2)! v(T )
=
∑
T⊆N:|T |>n2
4(|T |)!(n−|T |)!(2|T |−n)
(n+2)! [v(T )−v(N\T )] . 
A12. Proof of Theorem 10
(v) =⇒ (i) : If θ = ρ= 1, then by (5) and (13), ψi[v;µ] = Ψi[v] for all i ∈ N.
(i) =⇒ (v) : By (5) and (13), ψ[v;µ] = Ψ[v] if and only if
β(θ+ |T |−1,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) =
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
n! (A.13)
for all T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅. For any T ⊆ N with 1 ≤ |T | ≤ n− 1 and any i 6∈ T , we apply
Z = T ∪ i to equation (A.13),
β(θ+ |Z|−1,ρ+n−|Z|)
β(θ,ρ) =
(|Z|−1)!(n−|Z|)!
n! (A.14)
Using |Z|= |T |+ 1, we write the ratios between (A.13) and (A.14),
β(θ+ |T |−1,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ+ |T |,ρ+n−|T |−1) =
(|T |−1)!(n−|T |)!
(|T |)!(n−|T |−1)! .
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Using the property of beta function, we simplify the above ratios to get n(θ− 1) =
|T |(θ+ρ−2) for all T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅, T 6= N. Therefore, θ = ρ= 1.
(i) =⇒ (ii) : This follows from the efficiency property of the Shapley value.
(ii) =⇒ (i) : As µ ∈F , (i) follows from Theorem 1.
(v) =⇒ (iii) : By (12), the aggregate expected marginal loss ∑
i∈N
λi[v;µ] is
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N\i
β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) [v(T ∪ i)−v(T )]
Z=T∪i=
∑
i∈N
∑
Z⊆N:Z3i
β(θ+|Z|−1,ρ+n−|Z|+1)
β(θ,ρ) v(Z)−
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N\i
β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
=
∑
Z⊆N:Z 6=∅
∑
i∈Z
β(θ+|Z|−1,ρ+n−|Z|+1)
β(θ,ρ) v(Z)−
∑
T⊆N
∑
i∈N\T
β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
T=Z=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
|T |β(θ+|T |−1,ρ+n−|T |+1)−(n−|T |)β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
nβ(θ,ρ+n)
β(θ,ρ) v(∅)
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
[ |T |(ρ+n−|T |)
θ+|T |−1 − (n−|T |)
]
β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
nβ(θ,ρ+n)
β(θ,ρ) v(∅).
(A.15)
When θ = ρ= 1,
∑
i∈N
λi[v;µ] =
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
β(|T |+1,n+1−|T |)
β(1,1) v(T )−
nβ(1,n+1)
β(1,1) v(∅)
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
(n+1)! v(T )− nn+1v(∅)
=
∑
T⊆N
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
(n+1)! v(T )−v(∅).
Note that by (12),
Ev(S) =
∑
T⊆N
β(θ+ |T |,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) v(T ). (A.16)
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When θ = ρ= 1, it reduces to
Ev(S) =
∑
T⊆N
(|T |)!(n−|T |)!
(n+ 1)! v(T ) =
∑
i∈N
λi[v;µ] +v(∅).
(iii) =⇒ (v) : For ∑
i∈N
λi[v;µ] =Ev(S)−v(∅) to hold, by (A.15) and (A.16), we need

|T |(ρ+n−|T |)
θ+|T |−1 − (n−|T |) = 1, ∀ T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅;
−nβ(θ,ρ+n)β(θ,ρ) =
β(θ,ρ+n)
β(θ,ρ) −1.
The solution is θ = ρ= 1.
(iii) =⇒ (iv) : From the above proof, we have already shown the equivalence of (i),
(ii), (iii) and (v). Therefore, (iii) implies that (ii) and thus
∑
i∈N
γi[v;µ] =
∑
i∈N
ψi[v;µ]−
∑
i∈N
λi[v;µ] = [v(N)−v(∅)]− [Ev(S)−v(∅)] = v(N)−Ev(S).
(iv) =⇒ (v) : By (12), the aggregate expected marginal gain ∑
i∈N
γi[v;µ] is
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T3i
β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) [v(T )−v(T \ i)]
Z=T\i=
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T3i
β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
∑
i∈N
∑
Z⊆N\i
β(θ+|Z|+1,ρ+n−|Z|−1)
β(θ,ρ) v(Z)
T=Z=
∑
T⊆N
∑
i∈T
β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
∑
i∈N\T
β(θ+|T |+1,ρ+n−|T |−1)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
=
∑
T⊆N
|T |β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
(n−|T |)β(θ+|T |+1,ρ+n−|T |−1)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
[
|T |− (n−|T |)(θ+|T |)ρ+n−|T |−1
]
β(θ+|T |,ρ+n−|T |)
β(θ,ρ) v(T ) +
nβ(θ+n,ρ)
β(θ,ρ) v(N).
(A.17)
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Thus, for
∑
i∈N
γi[v;µ] = v(N)−Ev(S) to hold, by (A.16) and (A.17), we need

nβ(θ+n,ρ)
β(θ,ρ) = 1−
β(θ+n,ρ)
β(θ,ρ) ;
|T |− (n−|T |)(θ+|T |)ρ+n−|T |−1 = −1, ∀ T ⊆ N,T 6= N.
The solution is θ = ρ= 1. 
A13. Proof of Theorem 11
As the ordering τ has the uniform distribution over Ω, each ordering occurs with
probability 1n! . Moreover, there are (|Ξτi |)! permutations in Ξτi and (n− 1−|Ξτi |)! per-
mutations in N \Ξτi \ i, the set of elements preceded by i in the ordering τ . Thus, the
probability of Ξτi = T is
(|Ξτi |)!(n−1−|Ξτi |)!
n! =
(|T |)!(n−1−|T |)!
n! . Using (17) and the law of total
expectation or the law of iterated expectations, we have
E[φ˜τi ] =
∑
T⊆N\i
Prob(Ξτi = T )E
[
φ˜τi | Ξτi = T
]
=
∑
T⊆N\i
(|T |)!(n−1−|T |)!
n!
n!(PT +PT∪i)
(|T |)!(n−|T |−1)!
[
v(T ∪ i)−v(T )]
=
∑
T⊆N\i
(PT +PT∪i)
[
v(T ∪ i)−v(T )]
=
∑
T⊆N\i
PT
[
v(T ∪ i)−v(T )]+ ∑
T⊆N\i
P
T∪i
[
v(T ∪ i)−v(T )]
Z=T∪i= λi[v;µ] +
∑
Z⊆N:Z3i
PZ
[
v(Z)−v(Z \ i)]
= λi[v;µ] +γi[v;µ]
= ψi[v;µ].
The above proof also implies (18), by the two probability components in (17).
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When µ ∈F ,

n!PΞτ
i
∪i
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! =
n! (|i∪Ξ
τ
i |)!(n−|i∪Ξτi |)!
n! δ|i∪Ξτ
i
|
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! = (1 + |Ξ
τ
i |)δ1+|Ξτi |,
n!PΞτ
i
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! =
n! (|Ξ
τ
i |)!(n−|Ξτi |)!
n! δ|Ξτi |
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! = (n−|Ξ
τ
i |)δ|Ξτi |.
For the Shapley value, let µ= µ[SV,0]. Then,

n!PΞτ
i
∪i
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! =
n! (|i∪Ξ
τ
i |)!(n−|i∪Ξτi |)!
(n+1)!
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! =
1+|Ξτi |
n+1 ,
n!PΞτ
i
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! =
n! (|Ξ
τ
i |)!(n−|Ξτi |)!
(n+1)!
(|Ξτi |)!(n−|Ξτi |−1)! =
n−|Ξτi |
n+1 .
For the unbiased Shapley value, the right-hand side of (21) is
4
∑
T⊆N\i
Prob(Ξτi = T ) E
{
(|Ξτi |+1)(n−|Ξτi |)
(n+1)(n+2) [v(Ξ
τ
i ∪ i)−v(Ξτi )]
∣∣∣ Ξτi = T}
= 4
∑
T⊆N\i
(|T |)!(n−1−|T |)!
n!
(|T |+1)(n−|T |)
(n+1)n+2)
[
v(T ∪ i)−v(T )]
Z=T∪i= 4
∑
Z⊆N:Z3i
(|Z|)!(n−|Z|+1)!
(n+2)!
[
v(Z)−v(Z \ i)]
= Ψ˜i[v]. 
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Figure 1: Diminishing Marginal Effect for a Typical Set T
Figure 2: The Endowment Bias Ratio
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